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Cato & Veil / Transnational repression

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Outside the country.
Still within reach.

A journalist’s contacts. A dissident’s family. A demand to return. Pressure can cross a border without the person applying it ever leaving home. We investigate these connections and coordinate support for people, newsrooms and organisations facing them.

Discuss a concern privately →Explore the research ↓Explore a pattern ↓
01 / A person living abroad

A person abroad, relatives elsewhere, an institution drawn in. Our investigation follows the connections between them—and establishes which are supported by evidence.

Country methods / TROM research

Explore the methods.
Understand the questions.

Pressure does not operate in the same way everywhere. Explore the channels described in each country profile, how they can combine, and the questions that distinguish a concern from a supported finding.

China / Profile

Pressure on the family. A demand to return.

The China profile examines how pressure on relatives, approaches through community networks and surveillance abroad can reinforce a demand to return. Digital exposure can also reveal contacts and activities.

Relatives are questioned about activities abroad.

Read the full China profile →

TROM State MO Profiles · pages 8–11. These are research pathways, not a fixed order in which incidents must occur.

Relatives at home01Approaches abroad02Return pressure03
The question to investigate

Do the family approach and the overseas demand refer to the same activity, people or requested outcome?

Pressure on relatives

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Pressure can be applied to someone abroad through relatives who remain in another country, including demands, questioning or threats to employment and property.

What we examine

Record what was communicated, when, by whom and whether demands referred to the person’s activities abroad. Connections need evidence rather than assumption.

How we can help

A chronology of the pressure, corroboration where possible and a coordinated assessment of the people affected.

Surveillance & tracking

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Concerns may involve observation, unwanted approaches or exposure of movements and private information.

What we examine

Assess specific incidents, available records and alternative explanations. An unfamiliar person or vehicle alone does not establish surveillance.

How we can help

Investigative assessment, fieldwork and technical examination where appropriate.

Coerced return & travel pressure

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A demand to return, an unusual invitation or pressure involving a third country may need to be examined in its full personal and legal context.

What we examine

The invitation, correspondence, identities, itinerary and any associated demands are assessed together.

How we can help

Investigation of the approach and coordination with relevant legal and protective specialists.

INTERPOL-related concerns

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A Red Notice, diffusion or travel-document record needs to be identified accurately. Its existence, legal effect and compliance are distinct questions.

What we examine

Establish which record exists and its status. INTERPOL reviews Notices and Diffusions; member countries apply their own laws.

How we can help

Research and evidence preparation alongside specialist counsel handling the appropriate challenge.

Digital intrusion & exposure

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Account access, targeted phishing, device concerns or publication of private information may affect both a person and their contacts.

What we examine

Technical findings must distinguish a suspicious message, a targeting attempt and evidence of compromise.

How we can help

Digital examination, incident reconstruction and coordination of practical security improvements.

Community pressure

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Threatening approaches or demands through familiar social networks can be difficult to separate from ordinary relationships.

What we examine

Examine the conduct and communications of identified individuals. Nationality, religion or association does not establish involvement.

How we can help

Discreet investigation of specific incidents and relationships.

Academic & corporate pressure

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Institutions may encounter pressure concerning researchers, employees, speakers or the publication of work.

What we examine

Compare the demand, the decision-making record and any stated consequences with the wider sequence of events.

How we can help

Institutional investigations, staff-support assessments and evidence for decision-makers.

Explore a pattern

What happened?
What followed?

Select the events that are relevant, in the order they occurred. Explore the connections worth examining and the country profiles that cover those methods. Your selections stay on this page and are not submitted.

Your sequence

Start with an event above. There is no required starting point or inevitable next stage.

    Connections to examine

    Your sequence will reveal relevant investigative questions here.

    The country research library

    Read a country profile.

    Each profile has its own permanent page, with the methods, investigative questions and research basis available as text.

    RussiaChinaSaudi ArabiaIranTurkeyRwandaUnited Arab EmiratesIndiaBelarusEgyptEritreaTajikistanUzbekistanKazakhstan
    Read our briefing: how cross-border pressure reaches a person →

    Selected public records / Evidence in context

    Different methods.
    Different kinds of evidence.

    These published examples illustrate the research categories. They are not Cato & Veil client cases.

    United States · Sentencing reported December 2022

    Access inside a technology company.

    The US Department of Justice reported that former Twitter employee Ahmad Abouammo was sentenced for conduct involving access to confidential user information and its disclosure to Saudi interests.

    Method: digital exposure and insider access.

    Read the DOJ sentencing account ↗

    United States · Jury verdict reported June 2023

    Pressure to return.

    A federal jury convicted defendants in an Operation Fox Hunt case involving stalking and a campaign to coerce US residents to return to China. The DOJ account describes the different verdicts and the evidence presented.

    Method: surveillance, harassment and coerced return.

    Read the DOJ trial account ↗

    Technical research · Published October 2021

    A journalist’s phone examined.

    Citizen Lab reported forensic findings of Pegasus infections on journalist Ben Hubbard’s phone. Its technical report explains the findings and attribution limits.

    Method: targeted digital intrusion.

    Read the forensic research ↗

    From concern to a clear instruction

    Support for individuals.
    A resource for the people responsible for them.

    A private assessment

    Establish the chronology, examine available material and identify what needs further investigation. Receive a clear distinction between established findings, possible connections and unresolved questions.

    An investigation

    Records, digital examination, financial analysis and relevant field enquiries brought together around an agreed brief. Legal or protective specialists contribute where the matter requires them.

    Continuing support

    Scope monitoring, reassessment and coordination for an individual, newsroom, NGO or institution. Agree responsibilities, reporting and fees before the work begins.

    Individual enquiry →Newsroom or organisation →

    Research, evidence and discretion.

    The explorer organises the methods and country coverage in the TROM Operational Matrix and State MO Profiles, March 2026. It is a research framework, not a live incident feed. The visual pathways explain mechanisms; they do not depict a named client case.

    Country context informs enquiries. Findings about an individual incident require supporting evidence. A report, an official allegation, a technical finding and a court judgment establish different things.

    The explorer runs in your browser without submitting your selections. For first contact, share only what is necessary to arrange a conversation and tell us how you can be contacted safely. If there is immediate danger, contact local emergency services.

    Further reference: Freedom House research · INTERPOL review procedures · Access Now digital-security assistance.

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